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Heckel: No Justice, No Peace

NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE: THE NEED FOR A STATE VERSION OF § 1983 IN
RESPONSE TO THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES
MADISON N. HECKEL
After the Civil War, violence raged across the South against Black
Americans as an attempt by racist Confederates to refuse the racial equality
guaranteed by the recent Constitutional Amendments. Congress recognized the
lack of state action in enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments and passed the
Ku Klux Klan Act in response, which allowed citizens to bring civil suit against
government officials who violated their constitutional rights. Reborn under
Monroe v. Pape in 1961, § 1983 has become the primary vehicle for enforcing
constitutional rights in the United States.
The sixty years since Pape have led to significant developments in the
Supreme Court’s understanding of what is and is not an appropriate suit under §
1983. The Court has heard numerous cases leading to a complex understanding,
or lack thereof, of what acts by government officials qualify as constitutional
violations. The system as it is currently designed cannot give Black Americans
and their families the remedy they deserve. The Movement for Black Lives thus
pushes for justice for the numerous Black Americans killed at the hands of police
officers. This paper argues for a state alternative to § 1983, enabling states to
develop their own jurisprudence and increase state Constitutional protections in
excess of what is enumerated by the Federal Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
On May 25, 2020, a convenience store employee called the police and
reported that a Black man bought cigarettes with a counterfeit $20 bill.1
Seventeen minutes after officers arrived, the man, George Floyd, was
unconscious. Minneapolis Police Officer Derek Chauvin knelt on George Floyd’s

1

Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (updated Nov. 5,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html.
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neck for nine minutes and 29 seconds.2
The video of Floyd’s death began circulating on the internet the following
day, resulting in massive protests across the nation, despite the COVID-19
pandemic.3 Polls estimate that as many as 21 million adults attended protests
related to the Black Lives Matter Movement or police brutality as of mid-June
2020.4 Before these protests, the largest estimate for any American protest was the
Women’s March of 2017 at 4.6 million people.5
These staggering numbers are understandable when one views the footage
of Floyd’s death. The footage shows Floyd lying on the ground, repeating over
twenty times that he cannot breathe, calling out for his mother, and pleading,
“You’re going to kill me, man.”6 Chauvin is seen kneeling on Floyd’s neck, his
face unphased and his hands casually in his pockets.7 Even more chilling is that
this footage was captured with Chauvin’s knowledge – he made eye contact with
the camera at one point as one of his fellow officers ensured passersby did not

2

Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Prosecutors Say Derek Chauvin Knelt on George Floyd for 9
Minutes 29 Seconds, Longer Than Initially Reported, N.Y. Times (Mar. 30, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd-kneel-9-minutes-29seconds.html.
3
Alex Altman, Why the Killing of George Floyd Sparked an American Uprising, TIME (June 4,
2020), https://time.com/5847967/george-floyd-protests-trump/.
4
Elliot C. McLaughlin, How George Floyd’s Death Ignited a Racial Reckoning That Shows No
Signs of Slowing Down, CNN (Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/09/us/george-floydprotests-different-why/index.html.
5
Id.
6
George Floyd: What Happened in the Final Moments of His Life, BBC (July. 16, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52861726.
7
Id.
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interfere.89
The protests after Floyd’s death focused on the concept of racial justice.10
Many participants in these protests held signs reading, “I can’t breathe,” which
were some of the final words of George Floyd and Eric Garner, both Black men
killed at the hands of police.11 Others held signs in reference to Breonna Taylor, a
young Black woman killed a few months prior when police executed a no-knock
warrant in the middle of the night.12
Approximately a thousand Americans are killed by law enforcement
officers each year, but only 121 officers have been arrested for murder or
manslaughter in these on-duty killings since 2005.13 A study by Northeastern
University found that while Black Americans represented only 12 percent of the
population in the states observed, they made up 25 percent of the deaths in police
shootings.14 This racial disparity became more pronounced in cases where the

9

Id.
Maanvi Singh & Nina Lakhani, George Floyd Killing: Peaceful Protests Sweep America As
Calls for Racial Justice Reach New Heights, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/06/protests-george-floyd-black-lives-matterSaturday.
11
Mark Morales et al., Chants of ‘I Can’t Breathe!’ Erupt as the Officer in the Eric Garner Case
Won’t Face Federal Charges, CNN (July 17, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/17/us/ericgarner-no-federal-charges-against-officer-reaction/index.html.
12
Richard A. Oppel Jr., What to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html.
13
Shaila Dewan, Few Police Officers Who Cause Deaths Are Charged or Convicted, N.Y. TIMES
(Sep. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/us/police-killings-prosecutioncharges.html.
14
Ian Tomsen, The Research is Clear: White People Are Not More Likely Than Black People to be
Killed By Police, NEWS AT NORTHEASTERN (July 16, 2020),
10
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victims were unarmed or offered little to no threat to the police,15 as was the case
in the killing of 12-year-old Tamir Rice.16
This racially biased violence is similar to the excessive violence
perpetrated against Black Americans prior to the Civil Rights Movement.17 News
of police officers killing Black Americans has sadly become normalized; these
killings occur at a rate of more than one every other day.18 Today, Black
Americans injured by the police are often unable to obtain justice through a guilty
verdict in the criminal justice system;19 § 1983 allows civilians the opportunity to
achieve justice through a civil claim of constitutional torts.20 These cases are
increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to win due to the Supreme Court’s everchanging standard for a § 1983 claim.21 Now, over 200 years after the creation of
§ 1983, states are no longer preventing Americans from receiving their full
Constitutional rights; rather, the federal government itself is the obstacle. It is now
the states’ turn to force equality under the law and create their own versions of §

https://news.northeastern.edu/2020/07/16/the-research-is-clear-white-people-are-not-more-likelythan-black-people-to-be-killed-by-police/.
15
Id.
16
Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by Cleveland Police,
Then a Fatal One, N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/us/in-tamirrice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by-police-then-a-fatal-one.html.
17
See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness (2010).
18
Alex Altman, supra note 3.
19
Dewan, supra note 13.
20
See generally Michael L. Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law,
68 MISSISSIPPI L.J. 157 (1998) (examining the use of § 1983 in constitutional tort cases and
incorporating common law).
21
Osagie K. Obasogie, The Bad-Apple Myth of Policing, ATLANTIC (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/how-courts-judge-police-use-force/594832/.
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1983 to protect their Black citizens.
Part I of this paper will go over the history behind § 1983 and how it was
established when states did not protect their citizens’ rights. Part II will then
examine the elements of a § 1983 claim and how the Supreme Court has made
these claims more difficult to pursue since Monroe v. Pape first established it as
remedy for those whose Constitutional rights were violated. Finally, Part III will
discuss how states can expand protections to their citizens by creating a state
version of § 1983.
I. BACKGROUND
Congress created § 1983 in post-Civil War America to protect Black
Americans in a time when state governments refused to enforce the
Constitution.22 After Monroe v. Pape, § 1983 civil claims led litigation against
state and local governments involved in constitutional violations.23 To examine
the need for state versions of § 1983, it is necessary to first analyze existing
statutes and its usage in courts.

22

Hanna Rosen, Racial Terror and Citizenship, 24 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOUTHERN
CULTURE: RACE 125, 126 (Thomas C, Holt, Laurie B. Green, & Charles Reagan Wilson eds.,
2013); The Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871, United States
Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/EnforcementActs.htm (last
visited Dec. 3, 2020)
23
Lynn Adelman, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Assault on Civil Rights, DISSENT MAGAZINE
(2017), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/supreme-court-assault-civil-rights-section-1983.
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A. The Enforcement Acts
The Reconstruction era was the nation’s attempt to rebuild after the Civil
War. Its focus was to determine both what the country would look like postslavery and what role newly emancipated Black Americans would take.24 While
the law of the country changed to explicitly favor racial equality, it did little to
encourage racist whites to view Black Americans as equal in status.25 Angry racist
white men throughout the South, often former Confederate soldiers, banded
together to threaten and use violence against Black Americans and their white
allies.26 These groups formed the Ku Klux Klan, which proliferated rapidly from
1868 through 1871.27 White men from all walks of life, including lawyers and
ministers, made up the Klan.28 The Klan was so popular that nearly the entire
white male population of York County, South Carolina partook.29 While the Klan
never fully centralized its power, its violent presence was well-known across the
South.30 W.E.B. Du Bois estimated that the Klan committed approximately 197
murders and 548 aggravated assaults between 1866 and mid-1867 in North and

24

Reconstruction, U.S. HIST., https://www.ushistory.org/us/35.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 2020).
THE ENFORCEMENT ACTS OF 1870 AND 1871, supra note 24.
26
Elaine Frantz Parsons, Ku Klux Klan, Reconstruction-Era, 24 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOUTHERN CULTURE: RACE 229, 229 (Thomas C. Holt, Laurie B. Green & Charles Reagan Wilson
eds., 2013).
27
Id.
28
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL
TERROR, 14 (3rd ed. 2017), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/lynching-in-america-3d-ed091620.pdf.
29
Id.
30
Parsons, supra note 26, at 230.
25
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South Carolina alone.31 An attempt to add voting rights for Black Louisianans to
the Louisiana Constitution in 1866 was met with a mob killing and wounded
nearly two hundred people.32 In 1870, Guilford Coleman, a Black man, was
abducted from his home, beaten to death, and thrown into a well for voting to
nominate a gubernatorial candidate.33 In total, nearly 6,500 documented lynchings
took place during the Reconstruction era.34
The introduction of “Black Codes” across the South essentially authorized
these extra-judicial violent acts.35 Black Americans were arrested and jailed if
found to be without “lawful employment,” though the only employment they
could legally have was as a domestic servant or agricultural laborer – jobs that
paralleled pre-emancipation roles for Black Americans.36 These racist laws were
not limited to the South; Indiana, Illinois, and Oregon also limited the entrance of
Black Americans through their state constitutions.37 In 1866, L.E. Potts, a white

31

W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 674 (1935).
Alex Fox, Nearly 2,000 Black Americans Were Lynched During Reconstruction (Jun. 18, 2020),
SMITHSONIAN MAG., https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/nearly-2000-black-americanswere-lynched-during-reconstruction-180975120/.
33
Campbell Robertson, Over 2,000 Black People Were Lynched From 1865 to 1877, Study Finds
(updated June 29, 2020), N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/us/reconstructionviolence-lynchings.html.
34
N. Jamiyla Chisholm, New Data Says: 6,500 Lynchings Occurred During Reconstruction (June
15, 2020), COLORLINES, https://www.colorlines.com/articles/new-data-says-6500-lynchingsoccurred-during-reconstruction; History of Lynching in America, NAACP, https://naacp.org/findresources/history-explained/history-lynching-america. (Lynching is defined by the NAACP as the
public killing of an individual who has not received due process.)
35
Equal Just. Initiative, supra note 28, at 23.
36
STEPHEN HUGGINS, AMERICA’S USE OF TERROR: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE A-BOMB 178
(2019).
37
Id.
32
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woman from Paris, Texas, wrote President Andrew Johnson and asked him to
respond to the widespread violence against local Black people, stating that white
people were trying to “persecute [Black Americans] back into slavery,” and that
“[Black people] are often run down by blood hounds, and shot because they do
not do precisely what the white man says.”38 Instead of listening, Johnson vetoed
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.39 Congress, however, being largely run by “Radical
Republicans,” favored equal rights for Black Americans, the establishment of
public schools, and disenfranchisement of former Confederates.40 These
Republicans responded to the passage of the Black Codes by passing the
Reconstruction Acts in 1867. The Reconstruction Acts created military districts
throughout the South to serve as the acting government of the region while each
state drafted a new state constitution.41 Congress also passed the Fourteenth
Amendment, which granted citizenship to Black Americans, and the Fifteenth
Amendment, which prohibited states from using race as a bar to voting.42 Radical
Republicans intended for these measures to force Southern states to comply with
emancipation.43
The continued growth of the Black Codes in the South, along with the
38

Equal Just. Initiative, supra note 28, at 12 (citing Mrs. L.E. Potts to Abraham Lincoln, June
1866, in PHILLIP H. SHERIDAN PAPERS, Container 4 (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress)).
39
PARSONS, supra note 26, at 230.
40
John M. Matthews, Radical Republicans, 10 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOUTHERN CULTURE:
LAW AND POLITICS 379, 380 (James W. Ely Jr. & Bradley G. Bond eds., 2008).
41
HUGGINS, supra note 36, at 178.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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anger and violence of the Klan, re-created slavery-era conditions and held Black
Americans back from attaining full equality under the law.44 An observer in 1865
said that the Old Confederacy “govern[ed] … by the pistol and the rifle;”
similarly, the Alabama Union League lamented in 1869 that, “We are more slave
today in the hand of the wicked than before.”45 Because they used intimidation
and violence and some of their members were police officers themselves, the
Klan held significant power over law enforcement officials.46 A plea for action
sent to the governor of South Carolina after a white moderate was murdered
further exemplified the states’ lack of action against this violence: “The colored
citizens of Laurens county [are] under intimidation and without the least
protection whatever, with our lives in jeopardy every day.”47 Republicancontrolled Congress determined that the state and local governments were
insufficient to protect Black Americans’ civil rights and thus passed the
Enforcement Acts.48
The Enforcement Acts were primarily intended to destroy the Klan.49
These Acts allowed the federal government to oversee elections and arrest Klan
members by making acts of violence or intimidation with the intent of hampering

44

Id. at 182.
Id. at 181.
46
ROSEN, supra note 22, at 126.
47
S. Misc. Doc. No. 548, 44th Cong., 2d Sess. (1877).
48
ROSEN, supra note 22, at 162 (The Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871.)
49
ROSEN, supra note 22, at 182; Stephen Cresswell, Enforcing the Enforcement Acts: The
Department of Justice in Northern Mississippi, 1870-1890, 53 J. S. HIST. 421, 421–22 (1987).
45
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voting federal offenses.50 Included within the Enforcement Acts was the Ku Klux
Force Act, passed in April 1871, which allowed the President to suspend writ of
habeas corpus and send in troops, without invitation from the governor, to areas
that were unable to control Klan violence.51 This Act gave individuals the right to
bring forth a claim when a state, or someone acting under the color of law,
deprived them of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. 52 It provided individuals
with a damages remedy against government officials, local governments, and state
actors.53 Just over 1,500 cases were brought under the Enforcement Acts, but the
majority were in only two federal districts and occurred between 1871 and 1874.54
The Act essentially fell dormant after 188455 but was eventually codified as 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.56 It was not until 1951 that § 1983 was first
considered by the Supreme Court.57
B. The Development of § 1983 Litigation

50

ROSEN, supra note 22, at 126.
PARSONS, supra note 26, at 232; Monroe v. Pape, 81 S. Ct. 473, 475 (1961) (citing Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68, 80, 83–85) (generally speaking, by passing the Act,
Congress exercised the power vested in it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the
provisions of said Amendment).
52
Monroe v. Pape, 81 S. Ct. 473, 476 (1961); Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 is Born: The
Interlocking Supreme Court Stories of Tenney and Monroe, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1019,
1020 (2013).
53
Nahmod, supra note 52 at 1020.
54
Cresswell, supra note 49, at 423.
55
Id.
56
Alan W. Clarke, The Ku Klux Klan Act and the Civil Rights Revolution: How Civil Rights
Litigation Came to Regulate Police and Correctional Officer Misconduct, 7 SCHOLAR 151, 155
(2005).
57
Nahmod, supra note 52, at 1091.
51
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The Supreme Court first explicitly interpreted the language of § 1983 in
Tenney v. Brandhove.58 A First Amendment case, Tenney was brought forward
when Brandhove, a self-described Communist, sued members of the California
Senate’s Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities under § 1983 and
sought $250,000 in damages for being summoned as a witness at a hearing on unAmerican activities.59 The Court ultimately found that the language in § 1983 did
not allow for legislators to be held civilly liable for acts within legislative
proceedings.60
Ten years later, the Supreme Court heard the revolutionary Monroe v.
Pape case.61 James Monroe, a Black man, brought suit against 13 Chicago police
officers after they broke into his family’s home, “routed them from bed, made
them stand naked in the living room, and ransacked every room, emptying
drawers and ripping mattress covers,” all while spewing racial insults.62 Monroe
was taken to the police station, detained for ten hours, interrogated about a
murder, was not taken before a magistrate, was not allowed to call his family or
attorney, and was eventually released with no charges brought against him.63 The
officers had no search or arrest warrants against him.64 Monroe claimed the

58

Tenney v. Brandhove, 71 S. Ct. 781, 788 (1951).
Nahmod, supra note 52, at 1026.
60
Tenney, 71 S. Ct. at 788-789.
61
Monroe, 81 S. Ct. at 473.
62
Id. at 474.
63
Id.
64
Id.
59
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officers’ actions violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.65
Monroe brought his civil claim under § 1983, claiming his family’s
warrantless search and arrest constituted a deprivation of their “rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution.”66 The District Court dismissed the
case, holding that the City of Chicago could not be held liable under § 1983 for
acts committed as part of its government functions, and the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed.67 To determine whether Monroe’s claim could
succeed, the Supreme Court turned to the legislative intent in the original Ku Klux
Act of 1870.68 The Court determined that the legislature intended for § 1983 to
have three purposes: (1) to override certain state laws, (2) to provide a remedy
where state law was inadequate, and (3) to provide a federal remedy where the
state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice.69 The
Court had to determine if “under color of state law” included acts of officials
who violated state law where the state already provides a remedy.70 The Justices
noted that the primary legislative concern was the Constitution’s lack of

65

Clarke, supra note 58, at 164.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads as such: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. Monroe, 81 S. Ct. at 474 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1983).
67
Monroe, 81 S. Ct. at 475.
68
Id. at 475.
69
Id. at 477.
70
Clarke, supra note 56, at 166.
66

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol15/iss1/7

12

Heckel: No Justice, No Peace

enforcement, not its mere existence.71 Thus, although legislators knew the Act
may be redundant on paper they found that a citizen’s right to sue abusive state
officials superseded any redundancy.72 Further, prior cases eroded the narrow
construction of “under color of” state law because the Act ensured that all official
actions were covered, regardless of whether they broke state law.73 Therefore, the
Supreme Court determined that Monroe’s claim was valid since Congress
intended to provide a remedy for such official misconduct.74
It is worth noting that Monroe was decided in 1961––in the middle of the
Civil Rights Movement.75 The Court had unanimously ruled to overturn Plessy v.
Ferguson only a few years prior, holding that “separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal”; that segregated schools violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.76 Black Americans across the South participated in sit-ins to protest
segregation in public spaces, and the Montgomery Bus Boycott demonstrated the

71

Monroe, 81 S. Ct. at 478.
Clarke, supra note 56
73
Monroe, 81 S. Ct. at 482 (citing States v. Classic, 61 S. Ct. 1031,1043 (1941); Screws v. United
States, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 1038-41 (1945)).
74
Monroe, 81 S. Ct. at 484; Clarke, supra note 56, at 167; Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 96 S. Ct. 2018 (1978) (Along with the Chicago Police Officers, Monroe had attempted to
sue the City of Chicago in this case. The Court continues in Monroe to determine that a
municipality does not qualify as a “person” under the language of § 1983. This was later
overturned in Monell v. Department of Social Services, but it goes further than scope of this
paper).
75
Monroe, 81 S. Ct. at 473; The Modern Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1964, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/subjects/civilrights/modern-civil-rights-movement.htm (last visited Dec. 3,
2020).
76
Brown v. Bd. of Ed. Of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 74 S. Ct. 686, 692 (1954).
72
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power of mass direct action.77 Race issues were clearly on the minds of many
Americans; Monroe’s status as a Black man was not lost on the Justices.78 The
Justices’ deep dive into § 1983’s legislative history clarified the connection
between the legislation and the goal of racial equality.79
The decision in Monroe expanded an individual’s ability to sue local
governments for violating constitutional rights.80 Monroe determined that § 1983
was as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment in its Constitutional protections.81
Monroe further found that state and local law enforcement officials were subject
to federal liability.82 After the Monroe decision, § 1983 became the primary
vehicle for enforcing constitutional rights in the United States.83 It is used today to
challenge the use of excessive force by police, race-based patterns of stop and
frisk, unconstitutional conditions of confinement, wrongful convictions, and other
forms of state actor misconduct.84 Private litigants file over 15,000 § 1983 claims
each year, and prisoners file more than 30,000.85 Many families of the Black
Americans killed at the hands of police have filed § 1983 claims as an attempt to

77

Kenneth R. Janken, The Civil Rights Movement: 1919–1960s, N’ATL HUMANS. CTR.,
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/freedom/1917beyond/essays/crm.htm.
78
Nahmod, supra note 52, at 1061.
79
Monroe, 81 S. Ct. at 475.
80
Adelman, supra note 23.
81
Nahmod, supra note 52, at 1059.
82
Clark, supra note 56, at 164.
83
Adelman, supra note 23
84
Id.
85
Id.
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obtain justice.86 A successful claim can result in a family receiving thousands, if
not millions, of dollars for their loss.87
C. Requirements for a § 1983 Claim
To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege a violation of their
constitutional rights committed by someone acting under the color of law.88 There
are three elements for a constitutional tort claim under § 1983: (1) a deprivation of
federally protected rights, (2) alleged causation by satisfying a type of proximate
cause requirement, and (3) deprivation caused by a person acting “under the color
of law.”89 While the causation element is heavily fact-dependent, the
determination of who is acting under the color of law and what constitutional
deprivations are covered by § 1983 are legal standards that have been clarified

86

Id.; see generally Michael Brown’s Family Received $1.5 Million Settlement With Ferguson,
NBC NEWS (Jun. 23, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brownshooting/michael-brown-s-family-received-1-5-million-settlement-ferguson-n7759366; J. David
Goodman, Eric Garner Case Is Settled by New York City for $5.9 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 13,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/nyregion/eric-garner-case-is-settled-by-new-yorkcity-for-5-9-million.html (discussing settlements of § 1983 cases for the killings of Michael
Brown and Eric Garner by police officers).
87
See generally Nicole Chavez and Christina Carrega, Breonna Taylor Settlement is Among
Largest Payouts Linked to a Police Shooting, CNN (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/16/us/police-shooting-lawsuits-breonna-taylorsettlement/index.html; Steve Karnowski and Amy Forliti, Floyd Family Agrees to $27M
Settlement Amidst Ex-Cop’s Trial, AP NEWS (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/minneapolis-pay-27-million-settle-floyd-family-lawsuit52a395f7716f52cf8d1fbeb411c831c7.
88
West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (1988).
89
Martin A. Schwartz, Fundamentals of Section 1983 Litigation, 17 TOURO L. REV. 525, 527
(2001) (It should be noted that this source identifies “the deprivation be caused by a ‘person’” as
separate from “acting under the color of law.” For the purposes of this paper, it made sense for
these elements to be combined, as the definition of person is not relevant to the topic of this
paper).
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over time.90
i. “Under the Color of Law”
First and foremost, for a § 1983 claim to succeed, the action in question
must be perpetrated by someone acting “under the color” of state law.91 State
actors are now bound to constitutional guidelines by § 1983.92 The traditional
definition of acting “under the color of law” required that the defendant exercised
power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”93 The Supreme Court’s
understanding of “under the color of law” stems from two cases: United States v.
Classic and Screws v. United States.94 The Court in Classic stated that “[m]isuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color
of’ state law.”95 This clarified that an actor works “under color of law” when their
role by the state is what gives them power over another individual.96 Likewise, the
defendant in Screws was found to have acted “under color of law” since he was in

90

Id.
West, 108 S. Ct. at 2255.
92
91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971). (Actors working under the color of federal law that violate an
individual’s constitutional rights may be sued in civil court under the judicially created remedy
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.)
93
Id., (citing Classic, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 1043 (1941)).
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Screws, 65 S. Ct. 1031 (1945); Classic, 61 S. Ct. 1031 (1941).
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Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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Steve Libby, When Off-Duty State Officials Act Under Color of State Law for the Purposes of
Section 1983, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 725 (1992).
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uniform arresting the decedent during the incident in question.97
The most obvious example of one acting “under color of law” is an onduty police officer, since officers are clearly perceived as members of the state.98
The Screws Court expanded this standard to include acts of officers who
“overstep[ped] the line of their authority,” though it does not include officers
pursuing their personal agendas.99 Police officer actions taken pursuant to the
authority vested in them by the state are considered “under the color of law,”
especially if those officers abuse that power and violate state law.100
ii. Deprivation of Constitutional Rights
Once it is established that an officer has acted under the color of law, a
court must next determine whether those actions deprived the plaintiff of their
constitutional rights.101 Although § 1983 itself does not grant rights to plaintiffs, it
does create a vehicle one can use to bring a claim.102 The right in question can be
any right normally derived from the federal Constitution.103
The leading Supreme Court decision regarding the deprivation of
constitutional rights by a state actor is Screws v. United States.104 The case
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Screws, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 1038 (1945)
Libby, supra note 96, at 726.
99
Screws, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 1040 (1945)
100
Libby, supra note 96, at 730.
101
Schwartz, supra note 89, at 527.
102
Baker v. McCollan, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2694 n.3 (1979).
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involved Georgic police officers who beat and killed a Black man.105 The officer
was charged with willfully depriving the decedent of his rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution based on his race.106 The officer claimed he
was not acting “under color of any law” and argued that it is only a federal
offense for a state officer to violate the law of his state under the color of law, as
opposed to the law of the federal Constitution.107 The Court countered by
explaining,
The problem is not whether state law has been violated
but whether an inhabitant of a State has been deprived of
a federal right by one who acts under ‘color of any law.’
… The statute does not come into play merely because the
federal law or the state law under which the officer
purports to act is violated. It is applicable when and only
when someone is deprived of a federal right by that
action.108

Thus, for an officer to be acting “under the color of law,” their actions
need not explicitly be illegal.109 The illegal act is depriving the victims of
their constitutional rights while acting as a member of the state.110
Screws does not involve § 1983, since it was heard before
Monroe.111 However, Screws is based off of the similar statute of 18

105

Id.
Id. at 93.
107
Screws, 325 U.S. at 107-108.
108
Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
109
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Id. at 93.
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U.S.C. § 242, which makes it a criminal offense for an official to willfully
violate the constitutional rights of someone within the United States.112
Although § 242 was created shortly before § 1983, it also states that any
wrongdoing must be committed while acting “under the color of law.”113
As a criminal statute, however, it requires the defendant to have
committed the crime “willfully.”114 The question therefore became what
part of the defendant’s actions had to be willful: the physical action––in
this case, Screws’ beating of the decedent––or the deprivation of the
deceased’s constitutional rights.115 The Court used the example of an
officer who acted based on a statute that was already deemed by a court to
be an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment.116 It was not the
officer’s enforcement of the statute, but rather his knowledge that it
violated the Constitution, that violated § 242.117 The officer, the Court
explained, would be “in no position to say that they had no adequate
advance notice that they would be visited with punishment. … When they
are convicted for so acting, they are not punished for violating an
unknowable something.”118
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18 U.S.C. 242.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 242 with 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
114
18 U.S.C. 242.
115
Screws, 325 U.S. at 94.
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Id. at 104.
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This logic in Screws was further utilized by the Court in Pierson v.
Ray.119 Officers arrested the petitioners in Pierson after they violated bus
segregation rules through peaceful protest.120 After their cases were
eventually dropped, the petitioners filed a § 1983 claim regarding their
false arrests and imprisonments.121 The Pierson Court examined the role
of immunity in § 1983 claims.122 The Court looked to Monroe, where the
Court stated the officers could have defended their case by arguing that
their actions were completed in good faith.123 Instead, the officers in
Pierson chose not to because they knew their search was unreasonable.124
The Court reasoned that the officers’ convictions did not mean that the
statute prohibited officers from the defense of good faith and probable
cause.125 The Pierson Court ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioners, but
it relied on the same logic as Screws and determined that an officer’s
knowledge of what is and is not constitutional is an essential aspect in
deciding if their actions “under the color of law” violated a defendant’s
constitutional rights.126
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II. DISCUSSION
Because police are rarely held accountable for their use of excessive force,
it is much easier for plaintiffs to receive justice through a civil § 1983 suit.127
However, police officers are often protected by qualified immunity, so these suits
rarely make it to court.128 Public outcry after the death of George Floyd led
numerous politicians to discuss how this can be addressed at the state level to
increase police accountability and justice for their victims.129
A. Qualified Immunity and § 1983 Claims
The Court’s numerous examinations of § 1983 cases further complicate
the analysis of when the statute applies.130 The decision in Pierson created the
concept of qualified immunity, which protects government defendants from
financial burdens, and a suit altogether, if they acted in good faith and it is unclear
if a constitutional violation occurred.131 State actors can assert qualified, or “good

127

Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1773,
1798 n.145 (2016).
128
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129
See generally Torey Van Oot & Briana Bierschbach, Political Antagonists United By George
Floyd’s Death to Forge Deal on Police Reform, STAR TRIBUNE (July 23, 2020),
https://www.startribune.com/walz-signs-police-accountability-bill-sparked-by-floyd-sdeath/571875822/; Christopher Keating, Connecticut Senate Approves Police Accountability Bill
in Wake of George Floyd’s Death After Often-Emotional 10-Hour Debate, HARTFORD COURANT
(July 29, 2020), https://www.courant.com/politics/hc-pol-connecticut-police-accountability20200729-jmvodtnfzvgsrf5ovbybupdecq-story.html.
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Anthony Stauber, When is a Right Not a Right?: Qualified Immunity After Pearson, 39
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. J. PUB. Pol’y & Prac. 125, 142 (2018).
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Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L. J. 2, 13 (2017).
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faith,” immunity when they are being sued for violating constitutional rights.132
Qualified immunity applies in all situations where the official operated “under the
color of law”, unless (1) the official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
and (2) the right the official violated was clearly established.133 If both prongs of
this test are satisfied, then the official is not protected by qualified immunity and
can be sued in their individual capacity.134 The order in which these questions
must be answered, however, has wavered over time.135
The Supreme Court initially held in Saucier v. Katz that, in qualified
immunity cases, a court must first determine whether a defendant violated a
plaintiff’s constitutional rights before determining whether they were working
“under the color of law.”136 This allowed courts to elaborate on the constitutional
question at hand.137 A few years later, however, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court
reversed, holding that the Saucier process was not mandatory and that courts
could examine the elements of a § 1983 claim in the order they preferred.138
Justice Alito said the Saucier process, which required a court to do both if one
element would not be met, was overly burdensome.139 The decision in Callahan
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Michael Silverstein, Rebalancing Harlow: A New Approach to Qualified Immunity in the
Fourth Amendment, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 495, 500 (2017).
133
Id. at 499-500; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
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137
Id.
138
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provided courts with the discretion to dismiss a claim if the right was not clearly
established.140
As a result, the Callahan decision created a dramatic hindrance for future
§ 1983 claims.141 The judicial system is failing in its notice-giving function by
allowing courts to dismiss cases involving qualified immunity without
determining whether a constitutional right even exists.142 The “clearly
established” prong of qualified immunity is supposed to protect officers from
punishment for an act they did not realize was unconstitutional.143 By providing
other courts with discretion to not rule on constitutional questions, the Court is, in
essence, allowing unconstitutional behavior to continue unnoticed.144
The Court made an example from Screws of an officer enforcing an
unconstitutional statute.145 That officer only knew his enforcement was a violation
of the First Amendment because a court had already determined it to be.146 For an
officer to not receive qualified immunity, that officer must have notice of the
constitutional violation.147 If a case is dismissed before the court addresses the
alleged constitutional violation, there is a possibility that a violation existed but

140

Id.; Colin Rolfs, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA L. REV. 468, 473
(2011).
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was not yet addressed by the courts.148 While the case would fail because the right
was not yet established, the right would continue to remain unestablished, making
future claims for the same officer action unsuccessful.149
A further issue with determining what constitutes a “well-established”
constitutional violation depends upon when that law was considered wellestablished. While many scholars assume well-established law is recognized in
contemporary law and equity principles,150 the Supreme Court instead looks to
traditional common law, meaning the law that was well established in 1871 when
§ 1983 was enacted.151
These issues are only the tip of the iceberg regarding the complexity of
qualified immunity jurisprudence.152 However, they illustrate the difficulties in
bringing forward a § 1983 case that can successfully make it to trial, let alone
prevail before a judge or jury.
B. Police Reform after the Killing of George Floyd
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Because politicians and activists knew that the system heavily favors
police officers, they used the momentum after Floyd’s death as an attempt to
provoke reform. Officer Derek Chauvin was charged with unintentional seconddegree murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter in April
2021.153 The city of Minneapolis awaited the verdict with bated breath and
prepared for possible protests by calling in thousands of National Guard members
and a heavy military presence.154 Many worried that “the city [would] burn” if
Chauvin was acquitted.155 Tensions heightened after another Black man, Daunte
Wright, was killed during a traffic stop in a Minneapolis suburb only a week prior
to the end of Chauvin’s trial.156 People celebrated in the streets as each guilty
verdict was read, chanting, “All three counts! All three counts!”157 While people
celebrated the verdict across the country, many also recognized the continued
need for change and reform to prevent future police killings.158
i. Minor and Possible Changes

153
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Less than two weeks after George Floyd’s death, Karen Bass, a House
Representative from California, introduced H.R. 7120, the George Floyd Justice
in Policing Act of 2020, into Congress.159 The Act has passed in the House, but
has yet to be voted on in the Senate.160 If passed, the Bill will lower the criminal
intent standard from “willful” to “knowing or reckless,” limit qualified immunity,
and authorize the Department of Justice to issue subpoenas in investigations of
police departments for patterns or practices of discrimination.161 However, the
Bill has been stalled by a bipartisan Senate negotiations team with no future
discussions in the works.162
Between May 25, 2020 and May 21, 2021, 25 state governments enacted
legislation regarding police use of force; policy duty for officers to intervene,
report, or render medical aid in instances of police misconduct; or policies
relating to law enforcement misconduct reporting and decertification.163 In
addition, numerous states, cities, and governors have reduced police usage of
chokeholds and tasers, increased body camera usage, and required transparency
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between police and the government.164
ii. The Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity Act of Colorado
On June 13, 2020, the Colorado General Assembly passed a
groundbreaking police reform bill: S.B. 217.165 This Act, known as the Enhance
Law Enforcement Integrity Act, increases body camera usage, bans chokeholds,
requires officers to intervene when other officers are using excessive force, and
more.166 S.B. 217 is unique because it is the first piece of state legislation that
enables civilians to sue officers under state law – essentially making it a state
version of § 1983.167 The legislation explicitly states that “[q]ualified immunity is
not a defense to liability pursuant to this section.”168 It also caps personal liability
for police at $25,000, making it an easier pill for Colorado police to swallow.169
The law does not take effect until July 1, 2023.170

III. ANALYSIS
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Colorado’s S.B. 217 is leading the way in police reform legislation by
forming a state alternative to § 1983171 and removing the complications of
qualified immunity.172 Through S.B. 217, Colorado’s citizens will have the ability
to sue police officers in Colorado state court for violating the rights granted to
them by the Colorado Constitution, the same way § 1983 allows U.S. citizens to
sue police officers in federal court for violating the rights granted to them by the
U.S. Constitution.173 Because S.B. 217 has yet to take effect, it is unclear how this
legislation will impact individuals who have had their rights violated by a
government officer.174 However, S.B. 217’s state alternative is a necessary step
toward protecting Colorado’s citizens and other states should quickly follow suit.
The legislature created § 1983 in response to Black Americans being killed
extrajudicially, and S.B. 217 was created for the same purpose over 200 years
later.175 Further, state constitutions can protect Americans in other ways, as state
constitutions can protect rights beyond what the federal Constitution requires.176
Other states across the country should evaluate how their own legislatures can
pioneer a form of justice that the federal judicial system simply cannot provide.
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A. History Guides the Future
The history behind § 1983’s creation indicates that its purpose is to further
racial justice.177 Black Americans in the Reconstruction era were denied their
newly found constitutional rights, and they had no redress available to them.178
The South’s lack of response to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and its violence lead
directly to the creation of § 1983.179 Labelled as one of the Enforcement Acts, the
Klan Act was created to promote and ensure equal protection for all Americans.180
Congress created § 1983 as a response to states failing to protect their own
citizens.181 Although § 1983 did not grant any new rights to Americans, it does
provid Americans with the ability to bring claims in court when state actors
violated their rights.182
The relationship between Black Americans and the federal government
during the Reconstruction era is paralleled today.183 Two-thirds of Black
Americans do not trust the police to treat them equally to white Americans.
Considering that police kill Black men and boys at almost two and a half times
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the rate at which they kill white men and boys, that is understandable.184
Furthermore, when these deaths occur, prosecutors very rarely bring charges
against the perpetrators.185 During the Reconstruction era, states did not protect
the rights of Black Americans, so the federal government had to create an
alternative route for justice. Now, over 200 years later, the federal government’s
option of § 1983 is no longer effective due to the complications of qualified
immunity. Therefore, it is time for the states to create their own routes for justice.
B. Embracing the Constitutional Floor
States have started to recognize that they have a greater influence on
police reform than the federal government does, as shown by the number of bills
introduced following the mass racial justice protests of 2020.186 A federal attempt
at solving a local issue, § 1983 is unique.187 Police departments are often run by
cities or municipalities with little federal oversight.188 Why, then, do the courts
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rely on federal law to bring relief when a state official violates one’s
constitutional rights?189 It seems more logical to look to the states’ constitutions
rather than to the federal Constitution.
It is fairly well established in American constitutional law that the federal
Constitution and its interpretations by the Supreme Court are a “floor” for
personal liberties and that states cannot go beneath that floor in their own
legislations or constitutions.190 However, state constitutions can raise protections
well above the federal Constitution’s floor. 191 Therefore, a claim under a state
version of § 1983 would grant a state’s citizens more protection than a § 1983
claim could in federal court. This approach is seen as somewhat controversial,
particularly when the state constitution’s provisions are similar to that of the
federal Constitution’s provisions.192 State constitutional interpretation, however,
is drastically different than federal Constitutional interpretation, if only due to the
ease of amending and revising state constitutions.193 State constitutions cover a
larger number of topics, including more “policy-oriented” matters like education
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and the environment, and are overall more “democratic” in their creations.194
These differences between state and federal Constitutional interpretations have
led to an increased variance of state constitutional interpretations across the
country, particularly in criminal law.195
The numerous protests after George Floyd’s killing proved that a large
portion of the population is advocating for police reform.196 Although § 1983 was
once the main piece of legislation behind civil cases against police officers, it is
now unable to effectively grant justice due to the increasing complexities of its
interpretation in federal courts. The Colorado General Assembly determined that
§ 1983 no longer guaranteed sufficient protection for Coloradoans, so it decided
to give its constituents the ability to bring civil charges in state court without the
qualified immunity defense.197 If more states choose to follow suit and create their
own forms of § 1983, state legislatures will be able to ensure their constituents are
protected to the fullest extent of their state constitutions, which may be in excess
of the federal Constitution can provide.198 The guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment are broad enough to force state courts to interpret what particular
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rights are covered by it.199 Similarly, states with stricter, more explicit protections
written into their constitutions can use a state version of § 1983 to enforce these
protections rather than needing to rely on the federal Constitution’s floor.200 The
federal Constitution and §1983 are no longer sufficiently protecting Black
Americans from police.201 Therefore, it is time states take the same action
Congress took in 1871 and pass legislation to enforce the protections granted by
their individual state constitutions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress created § 1983 to protect citizens from having their
constitutional rights violated by states that either refused to or were not able to
sufficiently protect their citizens. Since its enactment and its implementation as a
method for civil suits, § 1983 became the main vehicle for citizens to find justice
after experiencing abuse at the hands of government officials. The complexities of
the federal system, however, have made § 1983 an inadequate method for justice
because it often prevents claims of constitutional violations from being heard in
court. However, federalism allows states to act on their own and within their own
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boundaries. States can add their own protections that are greater than what
Congress and the federal Constitution can provide. It is time for more states to
join Colorado in creating their own versions of § 1983 and to give their citizens
the power to achieve the justice that the federal system cannot offer. In doing so,
states can follow the example of Reconstruction-era Congress by ensuring their
constituents are fully protected.
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